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Synopsis
This essay explores the metaphoric construction of the terrorist Other in 9/11
scholarship and literature. While academics demand an ethical engagement with Arab
and Muslim Americans, they unwittingly reify a binary distinction of Other-Same that
triangulates terrorist identity through ordinary Arabs and Muslims. Looking at Halaby‟s
Once in a Promised Land and Walter‟s The Zero, I suggest an alternative metaphor for
terrorism not as a regional or religious population, but as an internal impulse that dwells
within us all. Doing so more ethically and productively aligns terrorism with the threat to
global security in the post-9/11 era.
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Essay
I begin where this conference asks us to begin, by revisioning terrorism: defining
terrorism, talking about terrorism, and talking about talking about terrorism. What we
say about terrorism matters. How we say it matters as well, but I‟ll return to that at the
end of my presentation. After this panel concludes, I will go across the quad where I will
finish up a two-week section on Don DeLillo‟s Falling Man in which my students and I
will attempt to define terrorism through the characters of Hammad and Ernst Hechinger.
Those students, if I do my job right, will come out with a better understanding of the
complicated, polymorphous nature of the term and hopefully will not be as quick to
associate it with Islam as the technician at the Indiana Blood Center who, on seeing me
reading Halaby‟s novel, commented that Islam was a violent religion and Mohammad an
evil dictator. The stakes of this are high, at least in my own little slice of the world.
My students are young. They were anywhere from 10 to 15 when the planes hit.
There is not a lot of hate in their hearts, but there is a lot of confusion. I feel it is my duty
as an educator to dispel them of their myths about terrorism as best I can. This is an
ethical imperative on my part to dissociate Islam from terrorism, to clarify that Arabs are
not the enemy. I share the same impulse as a host of post-9/11 scholars who cry for an
ethical responsibility toward the Other, the Other defined as Arabs and Muslims both in
America and abroad. Kristiaan Versluys described this as a “poethic” imperative and
Richard Gray challenged writers to consider America as an “interstitial space, a locus of
interaction between contending national and cultural constituencies” (18). Yet such an
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impulse to consider the position of the Other should strike us as odd when we consider
historical precedent. As John Duvall rightly states:
If one retrospectively applied [the] perspective [of these critics] to fiction
after World War I, one might be forced to say that Virginia Woolf‟s Mrs.
Dalloway and Ernest Hemingway‟s The Sun Also Rises are failures for
their oblique treatment of the root cause of a historical trauma….
Hemingway and Woolf, from this critical perspective, should have
attempted to face the Serbian other.
What makes the contemporary situation so different that it requires a seemingly
unprecedented shift in sympathies? We will address that question in a moment.
First let us say that such a shift is neither wrong nor undesirable, as America‟s
response to 9/11 has instigated a “deadly spiral of violence” both in terms of its military
actions abroad and its anti-Arab and Muslim sentiment within the US. A chilling Gallup
poll conducted in 2006 indicated that one third of Americans felt Muslims were
sympathetic to al Qaeda and “fewer than half believe U.S. Muslims are loyal to the
United States” (Saad). In 2010 things don‟t look much different as 43% of Americans
admitted to being prejudiced against Muslims, which says nothing of how many
Americans are actually prejudiced. This painting of all Muslims as untrustworthy
terrorists has been promoted from the beginning. Anna Bernard compared newscasts
on September 11, 2001 that implicitly (and in the case of FOX News, explicitly) asked
their audience to conflate terrorists with Palestinians and in turn, all Arab-looking
peoples. And in a recent article in Harper’s, Petra Bartosiewicz describes how the FBI
has institutionalized these generalizations by seeking out not only terrorist cells, but by
targeting Muslims and Arabs they fear might become terrorists. Reminiscent of Philip K.
Dick‟s SF story “Minority Report” in which future crimes can be predicted and thwarted
by cognitively advanced mutant telepaths, the FBI stages sting operations on Muslim
Americans in an effort to draw out potential terrorist activity; often these targets don‟t
even know they‟re involved in a terrorist plot, let alone an FBI sting of that plot. Yet this
has not stopped them from being investigated and convicted.
The logic that underlies these practices relies on the conflation of Arab and
Muslim Americans with global jihadists—that is, the establishment of a binary us-them,
inside-outside logic (what I will later describe as a “container” metaphor). What is
important is that post-9/11 scholarship, even that which seeks to counteract the racial
profiling of the general media, engages in its own conflation of “ordinary” Arabs and
Muslims with terrorists. In doing so, they unwittingly establish an association between
these innocent populations and the jihadists just as FOX News conflated Palestinians
with the 9/11 hijackers.
And in privileging these texts above others, they overwrite the lived reality of
American history where the principle response to Arabs and Muslims after 9/11 was far
more violent than it was curious. In doing so they generate an “imagined community” of
America as a tolerant, peaceful nation, which is no less problematic than the patriotic,
city-on-the-hill rhetoric against which these same scholars situate themselves. Both
approaches impute a vision of a victimized America and unwittingly align Arabs and
Muslims with a terrorist Other. Indeed, this is precisely what Lebanese-born Jordanian
American writer Laila Halaby takes aim at in her compelling novel, Once in a Promised
Land.
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***
Briefly summarizing, the novel depicts the dissolution of the marriage of Salwa
and Jassim, an Arab American couple living in Phoenix, AZ. Their marriage deteriorates
for a host of reasons, among which 9/11 barely registers. Salwa, a highly successful
banker and realtor, falls prey to the “evolutionary mandate” (11) to have a child. She
secretly stops taking birth control, gets pregnant, and has a miscarriage. The thought of
raising a family in America and the trauma of the miscarriage drives a wedge between
her and Jassim. At the same time, Jassim is involved in a car accident that takes the life
of a white teenager. Neither able to deal with the death nor confide in his distracted
wife, Jassim‟s clockwork routine dissolves. Salwa and Jassim barely speak to one
another throughout the novel, and both begin extra-marital relationships. Their growing
distance from one another, however, is not caused by 9/11, but rather an ennui
generated by the alluring yet elusive siren song of the American dream.
To be sure, 9/11 plays a role in the novel. It prompts a teenager at the mall to call
security on Jassim for staring too long at a motorcycle. Later, Salwa deals with a client
at the bank who inquires about her heritage before asking to be helped by “someone
[she] can understand better” (114). Salwa saucily replies, “Of course. Would you like to
work with a Mexican man or an American lesbian?” And ultimately it is the post-9/11
surveillance culture that prompts an FBI investigation of Jassim‟s vehicular homicide—
the teenager was anti-Arab—and subsequent altered routine, eventually leading to his
firing.
Yet while 9/11 generates these explicit behaviors, the more pernicious problem
Halaby identifies is the false inclusiveness promised by the American dream. Despite
Salwa‟s personal and financial success, there is something alienating and isolating
about American culture. This is not realized as a result of the post-9/11 anti-Arab
sentiment, but rather through the initiation of her adulterous relationship with her
coworker Jake.
Jake seems genuinely interested in Salwa‟s cultural heritage, learning
conversational Arabic for her and inquiring about her family traditions surrounding
Ramadan. But readers learn he is not drawn to her, but rather to her exoticism. She is a
land to colonize, a body to conquer. Halaby even hints at the notion that his interest in
Salwa may be 9/11-induced: “What baffled [Jake] was that he had never really noticed
her until late in the fall, when she had glided onto his radar screen one morning” (171;
emphasis added), invoking the imagery of air-traffic control. When they finally kiss, she
reprimands herself in English because adultery is “an American problem, an American
situation.” Afterward, “Salwa felt lost, which is how it came to be that she began thinking
again about going home. Back to Jordan, with her family and her language and her
predictable world” (176). She does not leave immediately, though. Instead, she
consummates her relationship with Jake, twice, before resolving to leave America for
good. When she tries to tell Jake, the promise of tolerance and respect that he
demonstrates in his early romantic overtures are replaced by a blind, drug-induced
rage. He brutally beats her and she is hospitalized, unable to make her flight home.
We see a similar impulse in Jassim‟s relationship to his boss and friend, Marcus.
Marcus is reluctant to give in to the office‟s suspicions surrounding Jassim, despite the
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loss of clients and an increasingly intrusive FBI investigation. But when he learns of
Jassim‟s accident secondhand, Marcus feels betrayed and fires Jassim. Marcus‟s
actions are not inspired by 9/11—Halaby has given no inclination Marcus views himself
as a watchdog of the homeland. Instead, Marcus‟s actions are inspired by a sense of
misplaced trust. Marcus justifies his firing of Jassim by spinning a narrative of himself as
ethically superior, trusting, and inclusive—he pats himself on the back for having a
Muslim friend. Yet in spite of this, his response to Jassim after this switch is no different
from the teenager at the mall who called security: Jassim is escorted out of the office as
a potential security risk, unable to collect his papers.
In both situations, the promise of an inclusive America that accepts Arabs and
Muslims is proven false regardless of the events of 9/11. Of course, the construction of
this Other-Same binary is problematic in that the Other we WANT to identify is the
terrorist Other, but the Other we seek to address in scholarly discourse is the Arab and
Muslim Other. That is, we seem to feel we can learn about the one population by
triangulating through the other. Doing so reifies this binary logic and misidentifies what
terrorism actually is.
These misidentifications are precisely what Arjun Appadurai warns us about in
Fear of Small Numbers when he describes the complex generation of global terrorism.
Not only can the West inspire terrorists through their military ventures abroad, but at
home as well where anti-Islamic rhetoric directed at the internal minority aligns
otherwise non-militant Muslims with the terrifying external majority (111). The result of
this is that some “among these minorities—often educated, disaffected youth—begin to
identify themselves with the cellular world of global terror rather than the isolating world
of national minorities. Thus they morph from one kind of minority—weak,
disempowered, disenfranchised, and angry—to another kind of minority—cellular,
globalized, transnational, armed, and dangerous” (112-13). The attackers involved in
the 2005 bombing of the London Underground, Appadurai argues, were “Born out of the
shreds and patches of British multiculturalism. . . . it is the rogue voice of an injured
global majority” (111).
***
It is this isolation we see depicted in Jess Walter‟s The Zero. Told from the
perspective of a NYPD officer-turned-secret-federal agent, The Zero mocks US efforts
to draw out and identify terrorists. The novel follows Brian Remy‟s investigation of a
recipe for pecan-encrusted sole that should have been destroyed on 9/11, but was
somehow recovered days after, leading the paranoid Office of Liberty and Recovery to
suspect a woman was tipped off to the attack. Remy ultimately finds out the lead is a
dead end, but not before murdering and torturing a number of innocent Arab Americans.
Meanwhile, the Office of Liberty and Recovery vies with the FBI and CIA in an internal
turf war that culminates in a sting operation in which every suspect is a governmentbacked informant.
Although the novel is fiction, it seems to draw on a number of real-life FBI cases.
One such case is the prosecution and conviction of Yassin Aref and Mohammed
Hossain, two Muslim immigrants involved in a “missile plot” in Albany. The two were
accused of money laundering for a terrorist group seeking to buy a missile. “Yet in
4

announcing the arrest of Aref and Hossain, the FBI allowed that their crimes were „not
real‟ and that the public had never actually been in jeopardy. The plot had been a sting
operation wherein the FBI concocted the assassination plan and furnished the weapon .
. . it was unclear that either man even knew he was involved in a terrorist plot”
(Bartosiewicz 37). The sting was designed not to investigate individual terrorists, but
susceptibility to corruption in the Muslim community; a corruption that was not easily
linked to any terrorist activity.
Such is the case for the Middle Eastern characters in Walter‟s The Zero. Each
element of the final sting operation is staged, but uncoordinated. The informants are
unsure what their roles are supposed to be and when one refuses to participate another
eggs him on: “Look, just say some crazy shit on the tape. . . . You don‟t have to do
anything after that. Just cover your face, hold the machine gun, and say infidels and
wolves and shit like that” (312). But the operation goes awry and all the informants are
killed but one.
The only Middle Eastern survivor is Jaguar—a Western-educated doctor
disappointed with the racist intonations of his codename—who senses the trap and
follows Remy to Penn Station where he detonates the US-government-supplied
explosives. Jaguar‟s motivation, however, is unclear. When Remy asks him whether or
not he “work[s] for us,” Jaguar responds: “I‟m sorry, but your idea of us tends to be a
little bit fluid. You switch sides indiscriminately . . . arm your enemies and wonder why
you get shot with your own guns. . . . Are you with us? . . . May as well ask if I am
aligned with the wind” (291). It is uncertain whether he detonates the bomb to take
vengeance on Remy and the various government agencies for abusing Arab Americans
or to fulfill the mission Remy initiated, supposedly in America‟s best interests. The
bombing is viewed as a victory in the War on Terror because, the media reports at least
only one bomb was detonated.
***
Walter‟s novel speaks to the fear of small numbers Appadurai described and
highlights an important distinction between what terrorism is and how we approach it.
For Walter, terrorism is a tactic one employs, not a group one belongs to. At its heart
this is a problem of the metaphor we use to describe terrorism. As Lakoff and Johnson,
and more recently Fauconnier and Turner, have argued, human thought is largely
metaphorical in nature and metaphors play a huge part in how we generate solutions to
perceived problems. People offer different solutions to a problem if it is described as a
beast or a virus, for instance. “In the former case they are most likely to call for strong
law enforcement, whereas in the latter they are more open to solutions such as
rehabilitation and the understanding of root causes” (Ball).
After 9/11, terrorism was largely perceived through a container metaphor:
terrorism is a group that one belongs to, with an identifiable region, religion, skin color,
and uniform. Thus, George Bush could easily sell to the American public “We are
fighting these terrorists with our military in Afghanistan and Iraq and beyond so we do
not have to face them in the streets of our own cities” (2701). This distinctly nationalist
approach is evident throughout Bush‟s 2006 “National Strategy for Combating
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Terrorism,” that solves the problem through democratizing the Middle East. Terrorism,
for Bush and many others, is a beast.
In contrast, others saw “Islamic fanaticism . . . as a repressive ideology, born of
complex societal conditions, that won‟t be defeated by any predominately military
solution” (Bai). As Richard Holbrooke put it, “The war on terror is like saying „the war on
poverty.‟ It's just a metaphor. What we‟re really talking about is winning the ideological
struggle so that people stop turning themselves into suicide bombers” (Bai). President
Obama‟s revised “National Strategy for Counterterrorism” takes a different angle,
identifying that we “are not at war with the tactic of terrorism or the religion of Islam. We
are at war with a specific organization—al-Qa‟ida.” This deterritorialized strategy against
an ideological position poses vastly different possibilities in the fight against extremism.
Terrorism is a virus.
Of course, both the beast and virus metaphors imply an externalization of the
threat: a foreign invasion. But as Walter and Halaby both argue in their novels, terrorism
is just a strategy and a terrorist is one who performs that operation. That is, terrorism is
a decision we make, not a group we belong to. A war against terrorism is, as Robert
Adolph put it, a war “on our worst impulses.”
Drawing binary categories of Other-Same, even as part of an ethical imperative,
do nothing to help us understand or combat the internal impulse that leads one to
terrorist activities. Surprisingly, and perhaps upsettingly, it is precisely this impulse the
racially-targeted FBI investigations seek to determine: not who is a terrorist, but who will
become one. In this, Philip K. Dick‟s mind-bending “Minority Report” may be quite
instructive. The detective surmises that as soon as someone determines what the future
will be, “it cancels itself out. The assertion that [a particular individual] will commit a
future crime is paradoxical. The very act of possessing that data renders it spurious”
(213-14). Put differently, recognizing terrorism as an action one chooses rather than an
external Other places us in a position to cancel out the future violence our ignorance
might otherwise have promoted. Perhaps it is through an investigation of these impulses
that our greatest hope for security lies.
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